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In any aspect of business, one is faced with the problem of 
making dec isions. There are s everRl types of information available 
to the manager to aid him in his decision making. For example, he 
will always have feelings or opinions about the problem which could 
be described as his subjective information. Also available to him 
are different types of objective information such as the results 
of other decision problems with similarities to the problem at hand. 
Another desir ab le type of information may be the results obtained 
from an experiment or simulation on the problem involved. 
Aft er th e decision maker has gathered all three typ es of infor -
mation, he is faced with the problem of deciding how to combine this 
information into a final ~ecision. The Bayes' soluti on to the de-
cision problem provides a logical framework for working with economic 
losses or the utility of alternative courses of action, the prior 
information available to the decision m-:1ker, and formal modification 
of this prior information with the introduction of more current 
knowledge. The elements of the Bayes' solution are further defined 
and discuss ed in Chapter III. 
Chapter II is a brief review of the lit era ture on the Bayes' 
procedur e and applications of the proc e dur e to business probl ems . 
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Chapter IV is a further extension of the Bayes procedure to a per-
sonnel selection problem. The personnel selection was used because, 
to the author's knowledge, there has been relatively little work done 
in applying the Bayes' procedure to a problem of this type. Since 
personnel selection requires a great d~al of subjective decision 
making on the part of a manager, it is felt that by applying the 
Bayes' procedure this subjectivity can be developed into objective 
statistical data. 
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· CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The basic concept of a general statistical decision problem was 
outlined by Wald in 1939 [15]. Theoretical statistics, in recent ye~rs, 
has come to be dominated by the decision theory orientation, attribu-
table mostly to Wald, which tries to unify and strengthen the whole 
structure of statistical theory by treating statistics as a body of 
methods for making wise decisions in the face of uncertainty. 
Decision theory does, however, mean more than a decision orienta-
tion. Long before Wald, the idea of decision making had d0eply pene-
trated statistics, and some writers have been guilty of inaccurate 
labeling of pre-Waldian statistics by liberal use of the term "decision 
theory" [10]. Thus "decision theory" has often appeared to be a loose 
catchword like "operations research" or "motivation research". 
Actually, decision theory is a theory of rational b~havior in the face 
of uncertainty. Its first comprehensive presentation was given in book 
form by Wald in 19L~9, Statistical Decision Functions, [16]. In this 
publication the notions of risk function and minimax and Bayes' solution 
to d2cisions were studied. 
Wald's m~thematical model for statistical decision theory is a 
special case of that for game theori as introduc~d by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern [14]. Many of the results of von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
i.e., the reduction of games to normal form, minimax and utility theory, 
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and much of the research stimulated by their book are of basic importance 
for statistical decision theory. For further discussion of the statis-
tical decision problem in the game theory ~etting, the reader may refer 
to Blackwell and Girshirk [2j, arid Luce and Raiffa [7]. Although all 
of the works mentioned above provide ~xcellent background into statisti-
cal decision theory, this report will be more concerned with applying 
these concepts to business decision problems. 
Books on business statistics have often been out of touch both 
with statistical knowledge and with business needs. Probabilitv and 
Statistics for ]3usiness Dec!:_s:i.o~, By Robert Schlaifer of the Harvar.d 
Business School, is a major exception [12]. Appearing only a little 
more than a decade after the pioneering work in statistical decision 
theory by Wald, Schlaifer's book presents an elementary account of one 
"school 11 of decision theory. Its major theme is the use of theory in 
making business decisions. This theme is developed by a large number 
of realistic though simplified examples and problems and by the author's 
excellent advice on the application of statistics to practice. 
Schlaifer represents· a school that has made fundar!lenta 1 changes 
in the structure that Wald built. Wald strengthened an earlier trend 
-toward viewing statistical inference as the making of decisions rather 
than as the drawing of conclusions. He was concerned with the concept 
of consequences of decisions and built this concept into a scheme of 
viewing decisions in terms of a payoff table that relates possible acts 
to possible consequences. He applied the minimax principle to the 
actual choice of an act (making a decision). Wald's theory has had 
much influence on statistical theory but relatively slight influence 
on statistical practice. 
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Schlaifer departs from Wald by rejecting the minimax principle ex-
cept when it approximates well the result obtained from an alternative 
principle and is easier to apply than the alternative. The alternative 
principle is that of maximizing expected income or utility. This 
principle, in turn, is implemented by -a scheme known as Bayes' theorem. 
Another book by Schlaifer, appearing in 1961, is a somewhat con-
<lensed ~nd simplified version of his first book on decision theory 
[13]. This book differs in two fundamental respects from Schlaifer 's 
first book. First, it aims at a unified treatment of classical and 
Bayesian statistics, whereas the earlier book relied essentially on a 
form of analysis which tends to conceal this unity even though it leads 
to the same results. Secondly, this book aims solely at teaching how 
to deal with samples, whereas the earlier book dealt with a wide 
variety of decision problems in which samples were not involved. 
Another elementary book on decision theory by Chernoff and Moses 
also deserves high commendation [3]. It covers clearly, with self-
contained explanations of the mathematics used, the subject of decision 
.· 
theory as it stands today, without commitment to a particular 81school". 
It is mainly a prelude to a course or book that would go into the tools 
and trials of statistical applications, though it does give a general 
discussion of testing and estimation from the viewpoint o·f decision 
theory. An important predecessor of this book is one by Weiss [17). 
However, the mathematics used are a great deal more sophisticated. 
There also has been several recent articles on the various appli-
cations of the Bayesian approach to decision theory. For exan~le, 
one article by Green [s] was concerned with the use of Bayesian decision 
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theory in the selection of a "best 11 pricing policy for a firm in an 
oligopolistic industry where such factors as demand elasticity, threat 
of future price weakness, and potential entry of new competitors in-
fluenced the effectiven2ss of the firm's courses of action, F. J. 
Anscombe presented a talk, which was later published into an article, 
that was designed to illustrate the difference between the orthodox 
and Bayesian approaches in a marketing problem [1]. Another article 
by Murray and Silver made use of the B2yesian approach to analyze an 
inventory model that was intended to represent the problem faced in 
style goods merchandising, both wholesale and retail [8]. The object 
of this analysis was to determine a buying policy that shows the opti-
mal action at each opportunity for each possible state of information 
and each possible inventory position that the vendor may face. Lastly, 
an article by Hirshleifer tried to convey the ease and simplicity with 
which the Bayes approach solves those dual fundamental weaknesses of 
the classical approach what "criteria" to use in estimation problems, 
and how to specify the tolerable risks of error in testing problems 
[6 J. 
CHAPTER III 
DEFINITION OF THE DECISION PROBLEM 
The decision problem arises when a decision maker is faced with a 
set of alternative actions, one of which must be made, and the degree 
. 
. of preference for the possible decisions depends on various types of 
uncertainty. The two kinds of uncertainty that will be considered are 
the uncertainty due to the "laws of randomness" and that due to the 
lack of knowledge of the "states of nature". 
'..['he following example will illustrate the first of these uncertain-
ties. If a coin is tossed, the outcome is not a determined thing and is 
said to be governed by the "laws of randomness". Now suppose one were 
offered an amount h if the coin falls heads, an amount t if it falls 
tails. Then there would be two possible alternatives or actions, that 
of playing the game or of not playing. The decision of whether or not 
to play should take into consideration not only the amounts h and 
but also the laws of randomness governing the outcome of the toss. 
The problem would be further complicated if the decision maker did 
not know which laws of randomness apply. For example, assume that the 
coin has no defects. The decision maker can then predict that heads 
and tails are equally likely. However, suppose the coin is bent. In 
this case it seems reasonable to assume that heads and tails are no 
longer equally likely and the decision maker is uncertain as to the laws 
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of randomness which apply. The laws of randomness which apply will be 
called the "state of nature" of the system. 
In the above problem the decision maker would like to know some-
thing about the state of nature before he makes a decision to play or 
not to play. Suppose an experiment could be performed on the coin; 
that is, the coin could be tossed many times. The information gained 
from this experimen~ could be used to estimate the state of nature and 
the decision could then be based on this estimate. 
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This simple example illustrates the structure of a decision pro-
blem. The decision maker is faced with the choice among a set of alter-
native acts such that the con~equence of any actions depends upon the 
"states of nature". The true state is unknown to the decision maker. 
However, it is possible to gain information about the state by experi-
mentation. 
Let the aggregation of acts be designated by A and a particular 
action by a. Designate the set of states of nature by O and a 
particular state by w. Each possible outcome of the experiment will 
be labeled by an X and the possible outcomes constitute the set X· 
The probability of X given the state of nature w will be denoted by 
P(X lw). In order to clarify the following discussion let A have three 
possible actions: a1 , a2 , and a3 • ·Also let O have two possible state 
of nature· - c.c1 , U'2, and the set X to have two experimental outcomes 
X1 and X2 . If the decision maker has a plan which tells him which 
act to perform for each possible outcome of the experiment, this plan 
will be called a decision function d(X) which is a function of X 





d1 a1 a1 
d . 
2 a1 82 
d3 81 - a .3 
d4 82 a1 
d5 a2 82 
de a2 a 3 
d7 83 81 
de a3 82 
els a3 a3 
Consider for example the decision function d7 . This function assigns 
outcome X1 to action a3 and outcome X2 to action a 1 . 
Comparison of Decision Functions 
The decision maker's objective in any statistical decision problem 
is·to find a decision function d(X) which is in some sense best or 
good. In order to judge the decision functions, the decision maker must 
have some idea of the relative merits of the different actions a for 
· each state of nature w. Also, assume that the loss suff~red can be 
measured when action a is decided upon and the system is in state w. 
Designate this loss by the "los_s function" i,(a,w). For the a's:.ahd w's 
above the loss functions will be as follows: 
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States of Nature 
W1 W;:i 
a1 I(ad'w1 ) L(a1 f·~) 
82 £(a2 ! W1) i(a2 l·W:a) 
a3 L(a3 l·w1 ) _ t(a3 ! U},?,) 
Since the decision fun~tion d(X) depends on the outcome X of 
the experiment, the decision maker will need to compare the decision 
functions for each possible outcome.· A standard procedure for avoiding 
· this situation is to examine the expected loss called the "risk", and 
is given by 
R[d(X) ,ll.)] ~ t.[d(X),w] P(fl'w) 
It is clear that some criterion is needed for judging a decision 
function "good 11 or "bad". A decision function d(X) will be considered 
good if R[d(X) ,w] is "small 1' for all states of nature w. '!'his is 
not an unreasonable criterion to judge d(X) since R[d(X),w] is the 
expected loss given that the system is in the state w. However, since 
it is not known which state of nature is the true state, R[d(X) ,w] must 
be considered for all possible values of w. 
To be more precise, a decision function d1 (X) is said to be at 
least as good as d2 (X) if 
for every w n. 
is ' 
R[d1 (X),w] :5: R[d2 (X),w] 
is better than d2 (X) if it is at least as good 
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A decision function d(X) is called "admissible" if there is no 
decision function better than d(X). A decision function is "inad-
missible" if it is not "admissible". If a decision function d1 (X) 
is inadmissible, that is, if there is another decision function d2 (X) 
which is better than d1 (X), then l· d (X) no longer needs to be considered, 
A class of decision function is "complete" if for every function 
outside the class there is one in the c~ass which is better; a class 
is called "essentially complete" if for every decision function out-
side the class there is one in the class which is at least as good. 
A class of decision functions is said to be "minimally" complete if 
it is a complete class Such that _no proper subset is a complete Class, 
The following simple example of a decision problem will help illustrate 
some of these concepts. 
- Let the states of nature be "rain tomorrow" and "no rain tomorrow" 
and the acts be "stay at home" (and miss work), "go out without an 
umbrella" (and work in a wet suit if it should rain), "go out with an 
umbrella". The losses are arbitrarily determined and are given by 
the following table: 
States of Nature 
Acts w1 (Rain) ~(No rain) 
a 1 (stay home) 4 4 
a2 (go, no umbrella) 5 0 
a3 (go, with urrib1.· e 1 la) 2 5 
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The decision maker must listen to the weather report in order to per-
form the experiment. From past experience with the weather report, the 
decision maker is able to assign probabilities to the two outcomes of 
the ~xperiment, either a forecast of rain or of no rain, giv~n the 
state of nature. The frequency of resp~nses are given by the following 
table: 
1· States of Nature 
Outcomes --~--'--w-_1 _(R_a_in_) U}.a (No rain) 
Xi (Rain) . ! 0.8 0.1 I 
X2 (No raln) ! 0.2 0.9 
! 
---·-·-----··----·--·---·---
Since· there is only a finite number of acts and a finite number of 
experimental outcomes, the rnimber of decision functions is finite. 
These decision functions are given in the table on page The risk 
function can now be computed as follows: 
4 · 0.8 + 5 · 0.2 = 3.2 + 1.0 = 4.2 
In a similar manner R[d(X),w] can be computed for each combination of 
decision function d(X) and state cf nature w. The results are: 
13; 
I State of Nature 
l W1 U'2 
I 
dl l 4.0 4.0 
2 5.0 0.0 d 
d3 2.0 5.0 
d4 4.2 0.4 
d5 4.8 3.6 
d6 3.6 l~. 9 
d7 2.4 4.1 
dB 4.4 4.1 
d9 2.6 0.5 
From this table it is easily seen that decision functions d1 , d5 , d6 , 
and d8 are inadmissible. Decision functions d2 , d3 , d4 , d7 , and d9 
f . . 1 1 t 1 Th f d . . d1 d5 d6 d dB . orm a m1n1ma comp e e c ass. e our ec1.s1ons , , , an 
have been eliminated. However, there is still no clear choice among 
d2 , d~, d4 , d7 , and d9 . The problem of choosing among this set will 
be considered later. 
The concepts of complete classes and t_he class of admissible 
decision functions will not be discussed further in this !eport. Fot 
theorems concerning these classes, the reader is referred to Chapter 
Two of Wald [16]. 
Decision Functions Which Minimize the Maximum Risk 
One method for choosing one of the remaining decision functions is 
called the minimax solution. A decision function d0 (X) is said to· 
be a minimax solution of the decision problem if it minimizes the 
maximum of the R,[d(X) ,w] with respect to the state of nature w; 
that is, if d0 (X) is such that 
for all d(X) 





minimax decision function. 
Consider the preceding example: 
. Max R[d2 (X),w] 
Max R[d3 (X), w] 
Max R[d4 (X) ,w] 
Max R[d7 (X), w] 









--- l~. 1 
2.6 
is said to be the 
Thus the minimax solution is d9 (X); that is, if rain is forecasted, go 
with an umbrella, and if re.in is not forecasted, go without an umbrella. 
In the general theory of decision functions much attention has 
been given to the theory of minimax solutions for two reasons: 
1. A minimax solution seems to be a reasonable solution of the 
decision problem when the decision maker has no prior know-
ledge about the set of states of nature O; 
2. The theory of minimax solutions play an important role in 
deriving the basic results concerning complete classes of 
decision. functions. 
Theorems concerning complete classes and minimax s6lutions can be found 
in Chapter III of Wald [16]. 
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Objection to the Minimax Solution 
There are two major objections often raised to the minimax solu-
tion. In many problems the minimax solution is too pessimistic; Con-
sider the following example. 
Suppose there is a rumor that the ABC Aircraft Corporation has 
landed a government contract. Assume there are three states of nature: 
w1 (no_contract), UJ:a (small contract), and WJ (extremely large con-
tract.) The problem is for the decision maker to decide whether to 
buy (a1 ) or not to buy (a2 ) $500 worth of stock in the company. Also 
assume that at the present time the value of the company's stock is 
steadily decreasing, so if the decision maker invests and there is no 
contract with the government a portion of the investment will be lost. 
Suppose the gains and losses are as given in the following table: 
a1 (invest) 200 
a2 (do not invest) 0 





Now suppose the decision maker has a stock broker in New York. He can 
call on his stock broker to check into this rumor. However, this 
broker has been known to make mistakes. The frequency of response 
based on past dealings with this broker is: 
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State of Nature 
Exp er imerit a 1 
Outcome. Uh ... Ui;a tu 
3 
X1 (contract) 0.2 0.7 0.5 
X2 (no contract) 0.8 0.3 0.5 
The possible decision functions are: 
d1 (X). d2 (X) 
The risk for each decision d(X) and state of nature w is: 
State of Nature 
Wi Ul:a tlls 
d1 (X) 200 -200 -1000 
d2 (X) 40 -140 - 500 
d3 (X) 160 - 60 - 500 
d4 (X) 0 0 0 
It can be seen from this table that the minimax solution for the decision 
maker is cf (X) which is not to invest in any case. Although the 
decision maker would not lose anything with this solution, h~ would 
also never gain anything by following this solution. Such pessimistic 
decisions would not be conducive to any successful business. 
The second objection often raised to the minimax solution is that 
it does not take into account information the decision maker may have 
about the set of states of nature prior to conducting the experiment. 
In the preceding example, suppose instead of just a rumor about the 
contract, the decision maker can describe his information about the 








This means that the decision maker knows from past experience that 
7/10 of the time the state of nature W1 will be the true state, 
2/10 of the time w2 will be the true state, and 1/10 of the time 
lt3 will be the true state. If this is the case the decision maker 
can obtain the Bayed solution to the problem, which will be discussed 
next. 
Bayes Solution to the Decision Problem 
Consider a situation of a medics.l doctor making a diagnosis of 
17 
a patient's illness. If th~ doctor was only to take into consideration 
the results of th~ x-rays taken at the time and not the past medical 
history of his patient, he may have a somewhat limited diagnosis of 
the illness. The same principle applies in the Baye~ solution wiih 
the distribution P(~), called the prior probability distribution on 0, 
representing the probability based on the decision makef's prior 
18 
information of the true. state of nature. For a given P (w), defined 
the ''Bayes risk" for each d(X) as 
B[d(X); F(w)] R[d(X), w1 ] P(w1 ) + R[d(X), W;a] P(UJ;a) + 
+ .... R[d(X), w ~ P(w) 
m m 
if there are m w's in O. Then the "Bayes' solution" is defined to be 
the d(X) which minimizes the Bayes risk . 
. In the investment.example in the preceding section, the prior dis-
tribution wa§.: given. The quantities B[d(X), P(w)] are as follows: 
B[d1 (X); P(w)] = (200) 7/10 - (200) 2/10 - (1000) 1/10 = 0 
B[d2 (X); P(w)] - (40) 7/10 - (140) 2/10 - (500) 1/10 =·-so 
B[d3 (X); P(w)] = (160) 7/10 - (60) 2/10 - (500) 1/10 = 50 
B[d4 (X); P(w)] 0 
Thus the Bayes' solution is d2 (X); to invest if the broker reports a 
contract and not to invest if he reports no contract. 
Summary 
In or~er to apply the principles discussed in this chapter, the 
decision maker must be able to determine: 
(1) the losses given the acts and state of nature; 
(2) the distribution function or frecµency of responses of 
the experiment; 
(3) the prior probabilities or prior weights on the states 
of nature. 
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,,, t;tti h:s given in this cha pt er the losses and prior prob-
., 'Ii.· :,:: 
lrif• orbltrarily determined in order to demonstrate the prob-
. ·-·~inncion of these elements of the problem depend upon 
<t.•,+-:~ ,; (j, .. '"' ' ' 
For example, in problems related to business 
;r;,,r' ~.~\\r.:· can usually ascertain the monetary loss for each 
.,,, ,. ·:i •• , d ,1,t&- of nature. If nc monetary loss is involved, the 
"~'Ar ~ n.,;,;it sett le on some form of utility of each act;., given 
The reader is referred to vcin Neumann and 
,·""··,,d ,,,.,,,: or Davidson [4] for further discussion of utility 
~.0 ,,. drtermination of the frequency of response of the 
~~A r~acier ii referred to an elementary statistics book. 
f'. ,,L,~;; Hties can be either the decision maker's subject:lve 
.. , $ .,, , ,.,; tt,!)t~s of nature prior to conducting the experiments, or 
. ,_, ;;_··,.,,, h,t;"G on objective information known to the decision maker 
·. ,,, n_.~rf t'l".rnl: is conducted. The following chapter will attempt 
·~ ~.~1,.r the determination of these elements of the problem 
CHAPTER IV 
APPLICATION OF BAYES PROCEDURE: 
PERSONNEL SELECTION 
Introduction 
Suppose the ABC corporation needs a decision rule in their per-
sonnel department which will establish a fixed procedure for the 
selection of new employees. In order to establish this procedure, the 
theory of the preceding chapter is applied. 
There are two types of information on which the decision rule is 
based. First, there is the prior information about the applicant which 
includes such things as grade point average, graduate degree, iuforma-
tion obtained from the interview, etc. This type of information is 
used as B basis for the prior probability distribution on the states 
of nature. The second type of information is the result of a test 
designed to measure the aptitude of the applicant in his particular 
field of interest. 
Determination of the Loss Table 
The problem is to determine, based on these two types of informa-
tion, what salary should be offered to the applicant if the company 
should, in fact, make him an offer. Suppose there are three salaries 




1. $700 per month 
2. $800 per month 
3. $900 per month. 
Of course, the company does not have to make an offer to a prospective 
employee. Thus, the acts which this G.Ompany can take are: 
a1 do not hire 
a2 hire at $700 per month 
83 hire at $800 per month 
a4 hire at $900 per month. 
Assume it is possible to determine, with some degree of accuracy, 
the placement of each of the present employees into four levels of 
average monetary worth to the company. Suppose these four levels are: 
w1 worth $400 per month for the first year and will lose 
the company $25,000 if he remains with the company 
until retirement; 
worth $600 per month for the first. year and will make 
his salary each year • += l. .L he remains until retirement; 
worth $800 per month for the first year and will net the 
company $25,000 if he remains with the company until 
retirement; 
w4 worth $1,000 per month for the fir st year and will net 
the company $50,000 if he remains with the· company until 
retirement. 
These states of nature are denoted by thew's. 
Accordi~g to the employment records of the company, the personnel 
department-finds that if an employee is i.n state of nature w1 , and i.f 
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he was hired at $700 per month, there is an 80 per cent chance of his 
remaining with the company until retirement. If the same employee 
was hired at $800 per month, there is a 90 per cent change of his 
remaining with the company until retirement. Tab le I gives the per-
centage of employees which remain with the company until retirement, 
for each act and state of nature combination. 
TABLE I 
PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES THAT REMAIN 
-----·-
W2 Ws W4 
-~ -. ___________ .... __ 
A ~States of Nature . cts "-- w1 
.00 .00 .00 .00 
.80 .80 . 70 .50 
. 90 .90 . 80 . 70 
.95 .90 .90 .80 
·--------·-·------
It costs the company ~200 to interview, process, and administer 
the aptitutde test to each prospective employee. It costs the com-
pany an additional $100 to hire an applicant. 
Now it is possible to determine the loss function or table for 
these acts and states of nature. Suppose the "true" state of nature is 
w1 , and a1 is decided upon by the decision maker. Then the only loss 
is the $200 required for the interviewing, processing, and administering 
the test. If, in fact, a1 is the action taken, then the loss is $200 
.for each state of nature. Now suppose the "true" state of nature is 
w1 , and a2 is decided upon. In this case the loss is $200 plus $100 
for hiring cost plus 12($300) = $3~600 lost the first year on the 
23 
employee plus 80 per cent of $25,000 lost over the remaining period 
of his employment. The total loss is: 
$200 + $100 + $3,600 + $20,000 $23,900. 
Next, suppose the "true" state of nat~re is w3 , and a2 is the action 
taken. The loss is: 
$200 + $100 + 12(-$100) + .7(-$25,000) -$18,400 
The minus sign indicates gain. The other losses are similarly determined. 
Table II gives the entire loss function. 
A ""State 

















W2 IJJ3 (!)4 
··------
2 2 2 
15 -·184 -283 
27 -197 -371 
39 -210 -409 
Frequency of Response Table 
In order for the company to establish a criteria for judging an 
applicant's performance on the aptitude test, the test was given to 
all the present employees. It was found that 70 per cent of those in 
state of nature w1 had a score between zero and twenty out of a 
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possible sixty points. Thirty per cent of those in state of nature w1 
made between twenty-one and forty on the test. Let X1 denote the out~ 
come of the score between zero and twenty; X2 , the outcome of the score 
between twenty-one and forty; X3 , the outcome of the score between 
fortj-one and sixty. The frequencies of response for each state of 
nature and outcome combination are given in Table III. 
TABLE III 
FREQUENCY OF RESPONSE 
· · ~ State of Nature 
Outcome ""' W1 W:a W3 W4 
X1 .70 .30 .10 .00 
X2 .30 .50 .40 .20 
X3 0 . 20 .50 .80 
l. 00 1. 00 1. 00 1.00 
Decision Functions 
In this problem there are.four acts and three possible outcomes 
to the experiment. In general, when there are m acts and n outcomes 
there are 
n m possible decision functions. Thus, in this case, there 
are 43 possible decision functions or a total of sixty-four. Table 
IV lists the possible decision functions for this problem. 
TABLE IV 
·poSSIBLE DECISION FUNCTIONS 
----- ··- ------------------- --------------- ---------
~D . " F . 
d\X) icx) 
') 
d4 (X) d5 (X) icx) d7(X) icx) 0 t ~c1.s1.on . unction dJ(X) u come 
X ' a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 l I X2 a1 a1 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a2 
V I a1 a2 a3 a4 a1 a2 a3 a4 ''"3 I 
I 
I 
I d9cx> dlO(X) dJ.l(Y) , .. d12(X) d13 (X) dl4(X) dlS(X) i 6 cx) 
I 
X1 i a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 X2 I a,'3 as a3 as a4 a4 a4 a4 
X3 ,, a1 a2 23 a4 a1 a2 ,a3 a4 l 
l 
I 
! dl7(X) dl8(X) d 19cx) 'JQ ct"" (X) 
' 




) a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 l 
X2 ! a1 a1 al a1 a2 a2 a2 a2 
~ 
X3 ; a1 a2 a3 a4 a1 a2 a3 a4 
l 
~ 
i i 5 (X) 
' 
i 6(x) i 7 (X) i 8 (x) i 9 (X) d30(X) d3 \x) d32(X) 
J 
X1 . -~ a2 a2 a::z a2 a2 a2 a2 a2 ] 
X2 l a,3 a3 a3 a3 a4 a4 a4 a4 
X:a 
,, 
a1 a2 a3 a4 a1 a2 83 a4 ~ 
N 
V1 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Function d33(X) d34(X) d35(X) d36(X) 
Xi 83 83 83 83 
X2 a1 a1 a1 a1 
X3 81 a2 83 a 4 
d4\x) d42(X) i 3(X) d44(X) 
X1 l a3 a3 as I a3 X2 a3 83 83 83; 
X3 l . 81 82 83 84 
I I d49 (X) dso(x) d5\x) d52(X) 
X1 i a4 84 84 84 X2 l 81 a1 81 81 ! 
X3 I 81 82 83 84 
I 
I d57 (X) d58(X) d59(X) i 0(x) 
r 
X1 i 84 84 84 84 I 



















































Comparison of the Decision Functions 
At this point the risk, as described in the preceding chapter, 
can be found for each of these decision functions. For example, 
R[d1 (X) ,Uli] = .l(a1,wi) • p (XI UJ1) + 
+ .R,(a1 , W1) .p (X2 I W1) 
27-
+ .l(a1 ,UJ1) ·P(X1 !Ws) (4.1) 
= 2 (. 70) + 2(.3) + 2(0) 
= 2.00 
Similarly, the risk for each decision function and w combination is 
calculated. These risks are given in Table V. 
Now the inadmissible decision functions can be eliminated from 
further consideration. As defined previously, dK(X) i.s inadmissible 
if there is another decision function dp(X) such that 
for all weo and for some weo 
Take for example, d5 (X) in the risks table. _Here, 
R[d5 (X) ,w1 ] = 73.1 > 2.0 = R[d3 (X),w1 ] 
R[d6 (X) ,W:a] = 8.5 > 7.0 = R[d3 (X), UJa] 
R[d6 (X) ,w3 ] = -72.4 > -97.5 = R[a.3 (X) ,lll:3] 
R[d5 (X) ,w4] = -55.0 > -296.4 = R[d3 (X), W4] 
TABLE V 
RISKS TABLE 
1 a2 d3 d4 d5 i a7 d8 State of Nature::-;:"".._~ .... ~~· "''-'U""~ ... ~.. d-
W1 11·0 2.0 2.0 2.0 73.1 73.1 73.1 73.1 U):a .o 4.6 7.0 9.4 8.5 11.1 13.5 15.9 
ills I 2. o -91. 0 -97.5 -104.0 -72.4 -165.4 -171.9 -178.4 
W4 f 2. 0 -226.0 -296.4 -326.8 -55.0 -283.0 -353.4 -383.8 
I 
~ 
f d9 io dll dl2 13 dl4 dl5 dl6 
! d 
wl 84.2 84:2 84.2 84.2 91. 7 91. 7 91. 7 91. 7 
W:a llL5 17.1 19 .5 21. 9 20.5 23.1 25.2 28.7 
W3 , -77.6 -li'0:'6 -177.l -183.6 -82.8 -175.8 -192.3 -188.8 
(.\)4 ~72.6 -300.6 -371.0 -401.4 . -80. 2 . -268.2, -378.6 -409.0 
dl8 dl9 /0 /1 /2 a23 24 i dl7 d 
! 
Wi 116 7. 9 167.9 167.9 167.9 239.0 239.0 239.0 239.0 
W2 5.9 8.5 10.9 13.3 12.4 15.0 17.4 19.8 
W3 t -11.2 -109.6 -116. l -122.6 -91. 0 -184.0 -190.5 -197.0 
UJ4 I 2. a -226.0 -296. 4 -326.8 -55.0 -283.0 -353.4 ·-383.8 
I 25 a26 a27 a2s a29 d30 d31 d32 ·' d L-• 
·Wi i 243. 1 243.1 243.1 243.J. 257.6 257.6 257.6 257.6 
Ul;a I 18.4 21. 0 23.4. 25.8 24.2 27.0 30.4 31. 8 • 
W.3 I -96. 2 -189.2 -195.7 -202. 2 -101.4 -194.4 -200. 9 -207 ,4 
Ul4 -72. 6 -300.6 -371.0 -401.4 -80.2 -308.2 -378.6 -409.0 N 00 
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Thus, d5 (X) is inadmissible. After eliminating the inadmissible 
decision functions, the remaining decision functions are given in 
Table VI. 
At this point in the analysis the minimax ~elution can be ascer-
tained. In order to do this the maximum risk over the states of 
nature is found. Then the decision function dK(X) with the minimum-
maximum risk is the minimax solution. In this case the minimax solu-
tion is d1 (X). This function indicates not to hire no matter what 
score is made on the.test. The reason for this outcome is the manner 
in which the problem was constructed. None of the prior information, 
such as grade point, interview, etc., was considered in obtaining the 
solution. 
Consideration of Prior Information 
30 
The personnel department decided that the following information· 
should be included in the establishment of a prior probability distri-
bution: 
1. grade point average, 




6. extracurricular activities, 
7. military status. 
At this point, consider the grade point average. The p~rsonnel 
department finds that of the employees with grade point averages between 


















.RISKS OF ADMISSIBLE DECISION FUNCTIONS 
dl i 
2.0 2.0 
I 2.0 4.6 
I 2.0 -91. 0 
I 





I 91. 7 91. 7 ! 
! 25. 2 28.7 








' ! 243. 1 










I 301. o 









2.0 2.0 73.1 
7.0 9 .4 11.1 
-97.5 -104. 0. ..: 165: 4 
-296.4 -326.8 -283.0 
dl8 dl9 a20 
167.9 167.9 167.9 
8.5 10.9 13.3 
-109.6 -116. l -122.6 
-226.0 -296.4 -326.8 
') a 
ct40 4? dJ., d -
264.9 264.9 276.0 
21. 0 23.4 11. l 
-191. 8 -198.3 -190.5 
-353.4 -383.8 -300!."6 
d7 i 
73. 1 73.1 
13. 5 15.9 
-171.9 -178.4 
-353.4 -383.8 
,22 a23 a 
239.0 239.0 
15.0 17.4 
-18l:-. 0 -190.5' 
-283.0' -353.4 
d 
44 6.8 d' 
276.0 313. 6 
29.4 35.4 
-203.5 -208. 7 . 



















2.0 and 2.3, on a 4.0 basis, 40 per cent are in state of nature w1 ~ 
55 per cent in state of nature c.112, and 5 per cent in state of nature 
w3 • Table VII· gives the percentage breakdown for each state of nature 
and grade point interval combination. 
TABLE VII 
GRADE POINT AVERAGE 
Grade p .~ State 
of Nature 
01.D . \, tll1 Ul.3 tit tll4 
2.0 - 2.3 .40 .55 .05 .00 
2.3+- 2.6 .20 .65 .15 .00 
2.6+- 2.9 .20 .55 .20 .05 
2.9+- 3.2 .10 .50 .30 .10 
3.2+- 3.5 .05 . l~S .40 .10 
3. 5 + _ · 4 ~ Q., .00 .30 .so . 20 
Similarly, Tables VIII through XIII give the percentage break-
downs for graduate degree, interview, references, experience, extra-
curricular activities, .snd military status, respectively. 
·TABLE VIII 
GRADUATE DEGREE 
D ~ate of Nature egree . tlli tll2 til3 W4 
M.S., M.B.A., MA.' .10 .40 .30 .20 
L.L.B., etc~ 





. ~tate of Nature Interview Ul1 Ul2 W3 W4 ---
Below Average .30 .60 .10 .00 
Average .20 .50 . 20 .10 




~tate of Nature Refer enc UJ1 W2 
Below Average .40 .50 .10 .00 
Average .20 .30 .30 .20 
Above Average .10 .20 . 50 .20 
TABLE XI 
· EXPERIENCE 
. ~tate of Nature _Experienc~ Ul1 U>.a W3 W4 
No Experience .3Q,., .50 ,10 .10 
Experience Not in Field .20 .30 .30 . 20 




A . . . '\::_ St at e of Nat ur e 
Ct J_V l. t l. es ·~ _· ---------,---W1 
Below Average .40 .40 .20 .00 
Average .20 .30 .40 .10 
Above Average ; 10 .20 .40 .30 
TABLE XIII 
MILITARY STATUS 
""' . -. . , State of. Nature 
Ob hgat 1.on '," 
'-. -----·-------
Unfulfilled . 20 .60 .10 .10 
Fulfilled l . 20 .20 • Li-0 .20 
Each of the categories described above are given points accord-
ing to their relative merit. Suppose it is decided that the grade 
point average ia worth 50 points, graduate degree 40 points, inter-
view 40 points, references 15 points, experience 5 points, extra-
curricular activities 5 points, and military status 5 points. At 
this point an example will best illustrate the use of the preceding 
tables in obtaining a prior distribution. 
Construction of the Prior Probability Distribution 
Suppose J. Q. Student has sent in an application, resumJ, and 
has been interviewed. According to the informatiorr from these sources 
35 
he has a grade point average of 2.3, a B.S. degree, a below average 
interview, below average references, no work experience, b~low 
average activities, and has not fulfilled his military obligation. 
In considering his grade point average, 
.40(50) 20 -points 
are assigned to state of nature w1 ; 
.55(50) = 27.5 points 
are assigned to state of nature w2 ; 
.05(50) 2.5 points 
are assigned to state of nature w3 ; and 
.00(50) 0 points 
are assigned to state of nature w4 . Points are assigned to the states 
of nature for each of the other classifications in a similar manner. 
The results of these tabulations are given in Table XIV. 
TABLE XIV 
PRIOR WEIGHTS ON STATES OF NATURE 
-------------·----
\,\ 
















I 1. 0 
! 
! 36.5 
W.2 (l)s (.1)4 
27.5 2.5 0.0 
12. 0 2.0 0.0 
7.5 1. 5 0.0 
2.5 0.5 0.5 
2.0 1. 0 0.0 
3.0 0.5 0.5 
54.5 8.0 1. 0 
=====-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==-=--==·-=-=-===-=======-------------·--·---·-·-.. ----------
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There are a total of one hundred points in this table. Thus the prior 
probabilities on the states of nature are: 
P(~) 
P(~) 












Now the Bayes risk for dK(X) is 
B[dK(X);P(w)] = R[dK(X),w1 ] P(w1 ) 
+ R[dK(X) ,w2 J P(w2 ) 
K -
+ /R[d (X) ,w3 ] P(w3) 
+ R[dK(X),w4 ] P(w4 ) 
(4.2) 
(4.J) 
For the prior probabilities given in equation (4.2), the best decision 
functio~ is d2 (X). The Bayes risk for this decision function is 
B [d2 .(X) ; P (w)] - 6.960. 
For comparison, some of the other Bayes risks are: 
B[d3 (X); P(w)] == - 6.21.9 
B[d4 (X); P(w)] 
B [ a?3 (X); P (w)] 
- 5.735 
23.567. 
Therefore, for J. Q. Student the best decision rule is h~t .to hire if 
he makes between zero and forty on the test and to hire at $700 per month 
if he makes between forty-one and sixty on the test. 
3i 
Suppose Joe Average submits an application to the company. Joe 
has a grade point average of 2.5, a~ M.B.A. degree, average interview, 
average references, work experience not related to his field, average 
activities, and he has not fulfilled his military obligation. In 
this case there are 140 total points. It is found that 24 points are 
in w1 , 69 points in w2 , 32 points in w3 , and 15 points in w4 • Thus 




















The best decision function for Mr. Average is d8 (X). The Bayes risk 
for this decision function is: 
B[d8 (X); P(w)] = - 63.032 
For comparison, some of the other Bayes risks for this application are: 
B[d4 (X); P(w)] - 54.922 
B[d6 (X); P(w) J = - 51.206 
B[d7 (X); P(w)] = - 59.396 
B [d12 (X); P (w)] = - 61.337. 
Therefore, the best decision rule for Joe Average is not to hire if he 
scores between zero and twenty on the test, hire at $700 per month.if· 
38 
he scores between twenty-one and forty on the test, and hire at $900 
per month if he scores between forty-one and sixty on the test. 
Now suppose Bill P. Brain sends an application to th_e company and 
was interviewed by a company representative. This information revealed 
that Mr. Brain has a grade point average of 3:1, a M.B.A. degree, 
above average interview, average references, work experience related 
to his field, average activities, and he has fulfilled his military 
obligation. In this case there are 140 total points again. It is 
found that 16.5 points are in w1 , 52.5 are in w2 , 46.0 are in w3 , 25.0 
are in w4 • Thus the prior probabilities on the states of nature for 




The best decision function 
for this decision function 
















B[d12 (X); P(w)] = - 114. 63.3 
d12 (X). 
For comparison, some of the other Bayes risks are: 
B[d8 (X); P(w)] - - 114. 301 
B [dL5 (X); P(w)J = - 11L279 
B[dl6 (X); P(w)] = - 114. 301 
B[d28 (X); P(w)] = 100.160 
(LL5) 
The Bayes risk 
~herefore, the best decision rule for Bill Brain is not to hire i~ he 
makes between zerd and twenty on the test, hire at $800 per month if 
he m~kes between twenty-one and fcirty on the test, and hire at $900 
per month if he makes between forty-one and sixty on the test. 
Summary 
39 
It is clear that in this problem, though i.t is more realistic 
than the examples given in Chapter III, several simplifying assumptions 
are necessary. The most prominent is the assumption that each of the 
present employees of this company can be placed in one of the states 
of nature as they were defined. In order to make this problem more 
realistic, perhaps more states of nature should have been defined. 
Also, the monetary values assigned to the states of nature would need 
to be adjusted for price level changes. 
One thing which was not considered is the fact that not all 
applicants will accept if the company makes then an unattractive offer. 
This problem could have been alleviated by defining further acts which 
include the possibility of increasing the amount of an offer in case 
the first offer is rejected. However, increasing the number of acts 
greatly increased the number of decision functions. For example, 
suppose in this case there had been ten acts. This would have in-
. creased the number of decision functions to 
= 1000 
If a computer were available to the decision maker, many decision 
functions could have been handled with ease. However, for this report, 
a small number of decision functions is necessary. 
40 
Even with these limitations, this application presents a logical 
. procedure for weighing and combining the information available. It 
also provides a method whereby both the subjective and objective in-
formation is considered while eliminating subjectivity in the procedure. 
·CHAPTER V 
·SUMMARY 
The problem facing any decision maker is that of constructing a 
procedure which will take into consideration all available information. 
The Bayes'procedure provi~es a logical framework for working with 
economic losses or the utility of alternative courses of action, 
the prior information available to the decisio~ maker, and formal 
modification of this prior information with the introduction of more 
current knowledge. 
The basic problem was,.described, decision functions were defined, 
and the application of the Bayes'procedure was outlined. The minimax 
solution to the decision problem was also discussed; however, it was 
concluded that when economic loElses are involved this solution tends 
to be too conservative for business applications. A realistic, though 
somewhat academic, application of the Bayes' procedure was constructed. 
Although this report deals with the Bayes' procedure, the Bayes: 
fo~mula per se did not appear eithe.r in the theory or the app lie at ion. 
The formula was used, but in a somewhat disguised manner. Suppose 
there are k states of nature, 
and n possible outcomes to the experiment, 
X1 , X2 , ••• , X n 
41 
42 
The risk was defined as 
n 
R[d(X), wj] = l 1, [ d (x. ) , w. J P [x. I w. J ]_ J ]_ J 
i=l 
where £[<l(X.), w.] is the loss incurred when X. is observed and 
]_ J ]_ 
the true state of nature is w., and where P[X. jw.] is the probability 
J ]_ J 
that X. is observed when the true state of nature is w .. The Bayes 
]_ J 
risk is then 
n 
B[d(X); f(w)] = P(w1 ) 
i=l 
n 
-1- p ( % ) l £ [ d (Xi) , W2 ] p [Xi I W2 ] + . . . + 
i=l 
n 
P(~) l t[d(Xi)'(J)k] P[xiJwk] 
i=l 
n 
l £[d(X1 ) ,w1 ] {P{w1 ] P[Xi jw1 J} + 
i=l 
n 
l £[d(X1),w2 ] {P[w2 ] P[x1 jWzJ} + ... + 
i=l 
n 
l t[d(Xi).~] {P[wk] P[xij~J} 
i=l 
n 
\ J.[d(X,),w1 ] c. P[w1 jx.J + L i i i 
i=l 
.n 
\ £[d(X.),w2 ] c. P[u:~lx.J + ... + L i i i 
i=l 
n 





P [w. J P [x. I w: J 





\ P[w.] P[x. lw.] . L J i J 
j=l 
Equation (5.1) is Bayes' formula. Thus, Bayei formula was used; but, 
as stated before, was somewhat disguised. 
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